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Abstract. This paper presents a standard endogenous growth frame-
work in which the source of growth is represented by vertical innovation. The
crucial assumption we introduce is that there is a positive information-gap
concerning the discovery of innovation. The aim of reducing the information
dissemination lag provides incentives for firms to decide to merge their research
eﬀorts. At the same time we find that the skilled/unskilled wage gap is strongly
related to this phenomenon. We prove that changing antitrust attitudes toward
eﬃciency motivated mergers in contestable industries may simultaneously ex-
plain observed changes in the industry structure, in qualitative innovation, in
wage inequality, and in labor supply composition.
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1. Introduction
Since the late seventies at least in the United States a relevant merger wave started
and at the same time the overall wage inequality rose, the returns to college education
increased, and product quality innovation intensified1.
Great attention has been paid by economists on mergers and acquisitions: the
character of mergers is viewed as a mean to reallocate resources according to the
most eﬃcient criterion (Jovanovic and Rousseau 2001). It can be classified as either
expansionary or contractionary (Andrade and Staﬀord 1999)2 depending on whether
firms are supposed to expande their productive capacity or rationalize their opera-
tions and remove duplication project risks (Jensen 1993, Mitchell and Mulherin 1996).
Regardless of the motives for firms to merge, merger waves seem to be associated to
the environment’s economic changes. The view that firms reallocate resources more
eﬀectively through mergers suggest a link between technolgical change and industry
structure: when a new technology is introduced in a economic system, not all the firms
would be easily able to run the technology and those firms having expertise in the
newest technology can therefore takeover the disadvantaged ones starting a merger
1A stricking example is the information and communication technology revolution.
2Previous research sharing the same charateristics is by Bagwell and Shoven (1988).
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wave and enhancing growth (Jovanovic and Rousseau 2001, Carrol and Hanan 2000,
Faria 2002)3. Several empirical approaches evaluating mergers’ impacts on the eco-
nomic context conclude for a positive relation between firms’ economic performance
and takeovers (Lichtenberg and Siegel 1990, Lichtenberg 1992), consistently with the
“reallocation according eﬃciency” theoretical view. Moreover, it seems that those
firms involved in an acquisitions process increase their R&D expenses above the sec-
toral average level and the increased R&D investment is likely associated with higher
profitability (Mcdougall 1995).
Unsurprisingly, the radical shifts in the distribution of wages that took place since
the seventies has risen a significant interest in analyzing the potential explanations
of this phenomenon. While there is a common consensus in the literature that wage
inequality is due to the nature of technological change which, being skilled-biased has
favored the skilled workers (Greenwood, Hercowitiz and Krussel 1997, Greenwood
and Yorucoglu 1997), a strand of thought points its attention to a complex set of
heterogenous factors acting with the skilled-bias to explain wage inequality: labor
market organization, institutional change and trade. Labor market has been reor-
ganized consistently with the pervasive recent technologies destroying several types
of high pay-unskilled workers jobs (Kremer and Maskin 1999, Acemoglu 1999). Isti-
tutional change consisting for the most part in deunionization process has weakened
the bargaining power of the skilled workers (Freeman 1991). And finally international
trade with developing countries has significantly increased the number of less-skilled
workers, depressing their marginal value product (Acemoglu 2002).
Although these research lines represent a continuous advancement in understand-
ing the above mentioned issues, their reference frameworks are separate sets, each
solely concerned with its own stylized fact. The aim of this paper is to suggest a way
to fill this gap.
This paper presents an R&D-driven growth model sharing several features with
the well-known Aghion and Howitt’s (1992 and 1998) basic Schumpeterian model,
in which the source of growth is represented by vertical (product quality improving)
innovation. Our analysis takes two aspects of innovating explicitly into account: the
discovery and the patenting of innovation. The crucial assumption of this model is
precisely that the time when the discovery of innovation is made by a first firm is
supposed to be unknown by the other firms. It becomes common knowledge when
both the first step and the second one are concluded. Hence, there is a period of time
when the firms do useless research eﬀort. The realism of this assumption has been
emphasised by Shapiro (2002, p.16): “since no disclosure is required when patent
application is filed, companies introducing new products that incorporate state-of-
the-art technology may find that they are unwittingly infringing on patents issued
3The argument had been introduced by Gort (1969).
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after their product design decisions were made and significant resources were sunk
in developing the new product.” Due to this information-gap negatively aﬀecting
research-eﬀort, a form of congestion appears in the R&D sector.
Consistently with these assumptions, our findings are twofold.
First of all, we show that the aim of reducing the information dissemination lag
provides the incentives for R&D firms to decide to merge, and for R&D workers
to cooperate with each others. This finding is consistent with the view according
to which mergers can occur as a result of firms following eﬃciency criteria. More-
over, it seems to confirm the point that often firms decide to cooperate through a
form of ex-ante R&D cooperation aimed at reducing the risk of duplicating projects.
Indeed any agreement to eliminate the information dissemination lag makes R&D
investment more eﬃcient and enhances growth. At the same time we find that the
skilled/unskilled wage gap is strongly related to the number of (cooperating groups
of) firms in the economy: the higher the number of research-firms, the lower the
probability of a firm winning the R&D race and the expected value of an hour in
research; the higher the number of firms in the market, the stronger the eﬀects of
the information-gap, the lower the skilled labor demand and the expected aggregate
growth rate, and the lower the skilled/unskilled wage gap. In this sense our model
provides an additional explanation of the above mentioned stylized fact.
Incidentally, our assumed information lag proves suﬃcient to purge a scale eﬀect
problem (Jones 1995 and 1999) suﬀered by the early generation endogenous growth
models, such as Aghion and Howitt (1992), despite increasing returns in the produc-
tion of ideas and a number of sectors that does not increase with population.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow. Section 2 introduces the basic
framework of the model. Section 3 presents the balanced growth properties of the
market economy. Section 4 analyses the relationship between market structure, R&D
activity, and economic growth. Section 5 endogenizes skilled labor supply. Finally
some conclusions are drawn.
2. Basic Framework
In this section we will introduce a new ingredient - information lag - into the basic
Schumpeterian model of Aghion and Howitt (1992 and 1998). We will derive the
main consequences in the next sections. As we shall see this new element suﬃces
in delivering strong implications about the relationship between concentration and
growth - reviving some of Schumpeter’s (1942) intuitions - as well about the growth
properties of the model.
The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived individuals with
linear intertemporal preferences
u(y) =
Z ∞
0
yte
−rτdτ
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where r is a constant rate of time preference.
Due to perfect capital markets and linear preferences, the equilibrium interest
rate will be constant and equal to r. There are three sectors, the final output, the
intermediate, and the research an development (R&D) sector. The final output and
the R&D sectors are supposed to be perfectly competitive while the intermediate good
sector has monopolistic structure: the firm that is the successful innovator retains a
temporary monopoly rent on the production of the intermediate good until replaced
by the next innovator. There are two categories of labor: the skilled labor L which
is employed both in the manufacturing sector and in the R&D one and the unskilled
laborM which is used in producing the final output sector. In the final output sector
the consumption good is produced by using a fixed amountM of unskilled labor -that
can be employed only in the final output sector- normalized to 1,and intermediate
goods x according to the following production function.
yt = F (M,x) = Atx
α
t
Labor market equilibrium implies:
Lt = xt + nt
let w and wu the wage rate for skilled and unskilled labor respectively, and ωt ≡
wt/At the productivity-adjusted skilled wage.
The intermediate monopolist’s profit maximization problem yields the usual ex-
pression:
πt =
µ
1− α
α
¶
wtxt ≡ Atπ˜ (ωt) (1)
In the R&D sector the discovery of a better quality of intermediate goods comes
in two steps - two phases of a single cycle-:
• a new intermediate good is discovered -first phase
• after the discovery the firms takes time to patent the new intermediate good
-second phase
Innovations’ use raises the technology parameter by a constant factor γ > 1.
We follow the standard Schumpeterian approach of modeling each R&D race as
an inventing lottery: at the beginning of the R&D race each research-firm participates
in R&D race with equal likelihood to discover the highest quality intermediate good
-first phase. The arrival rate of innovations λn is governed by a Poisson process: λ
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represents the productivity of research technology and n the amount of labor em-
ployed in R&D. However once discovered the better quality of intermediate good, a
fixed interval of time -defined δ- is needed to patent the innovation -second phase.
The time τ when the discovery is made -hence the length of the first phase- by
a first firm -that is the winner of the R&D race- is supposed to be unknown by the
other firms. Moreover the winner starts to earn profits due to his discovery after a
complete cycle: no profit is earned before a whole cycle is closed. The patent expires
when a next intermediate goods with higher quality is introduced in the economic
system -that is when a next cycle is concluded.
However due both to the structure of the two phases needed to complete a whole
cycle and to the fixed length of the second phase, the relevant time for a R&D firm
to consider is that one after which an interval of length equal to δ has not passed:
indeed nothing can be said concerning the innovation having happened during this
period because precisely a length of time δ is needed to patent the latest innovation.
In the R&D sector the winner is earns thepresent value of the returns from dis-
covering and patenting the higher quality intermediate goods:
Vt+1 =
h
πt+1 − λnt+1
³
Vt+1 − V¯t+1
´i
/r (2)
where the LHS represents the profit flow πt+1 due to the discovery of t+ 1 inter-
mediate good minus the capital loss λnt+1
³
Vt+1 − V¯t+1
´
due to the finite length of
monopoly rent.
The term V¯t+1 is linked to the structure of a cycle: a kind of delay is introduced
in this asset equation since no research-firm is replaced by a new innovator until the
second phase is closed. In other words the present value disappears some time after
the discovery of the next generation of intermediate good, when both the first phase
and the second one are concluded.
Consistently with this assumption it follows
rV¯t+1 = πt+1
³
1− e−rδ
´
(3)
By combining both (2) and (3) , it follows
Vt+1 =
πt+1 + λnt+1V¯t+1
r + λnt+1
=
h
r + λnt+1
³
1− e−rδ
´i
πt+1/r
r + λnt+1
(4)
The denominator of the previous expression r + λnt+1 represents the obsolescence-
adjusted interest rate (see Aghion and Howitt 1992, Aghion and Howitt 1998, ch. 2):
the second term λnt+1 can be intended as a creative-destruction rate linked to the
obsolescence aﬀecting the innovation. The higher the research level in the next period
the higher the creative-destruction rate the lower the present value of an innovation.
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3. Balanced Growth
For brevity reasons we will here perform only balanced growth analysis. It is not too
diﬃcult to prove that explicitly incorporating transitional paths all quantities and
prices tend to converge monotonically to the steady state values4.
The amount of labor to employ in the R&D sector is determined by the following
arbitrage condition:
wt = e
−λδ
R δ
0
nt(s)dsλVt+1e−rδ (5)
according to which the value of an hour in manufacturing (wt) has to be equal
to the expected value of an hour in research. The RHS representing precisely the
expected value of an hour in research has to include both the terms e−λδ
R δ
0
nt(s)ds and
e−rδ. The first one represents the probability that the highest quality intermediate
good could have already been discovered5 Moreover the integral
R δ
0 nt(s)ds refers to
the uncertainty concerning the innovation process: since no firm knows the time of
the discovery, the more the time after the end of prevoius cycle, the less the success
probability in the R&D race, the less the incentive to research. The second term is
linked to the timing of innovating. The present value of a higher quality intermediate
good appear some time after its discovery: because of it e−rδ has to be introduced in
the arbitrage condition.
By combining the (5) and (4) and the considerations concerning π (w) and π˜ (ω)
the arbitrage condition can be re-written
ωt = e
−λδ
R δ
0
nt(s)dse−rδλ
γ
h
r + λnt+1
³
1− e−rδ
´i
π˜t+1/r
r + λnt+1
(6)
Similarly to Aghion and Howitt (1992), the amount of research employment n¯ in
a stationary equilibrium can be evaluated as follows
ω
e−λδnλe−rδ
=
γ
h
r + λn
³
1− e−rδ
´i
π˜/r
r + λn
(7)
4See Tarola (2002, ch. 3) for detailed calculations.
5This probability is equal to 1 minus the probability that the higher quality intermediate good
has been discovered, that is 1− (1− e−λτδ
R δ
0
nt(τ)dτ ) where
τ δ = δ if τ ≥ δ − τ t
τδ = τ − τt if δ > τ − τ t
We focus the attention on the case τ δ = δ . For details see Tarola (2002).
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It is higher the lower the interest rate r, the higher the size of innovation γ, the
higher the arrival rate of innovation λ,the higher the total amount of labor force L
By manipulating the (7) it follows
ω = e−λδn¯λγe−rδ
h
r + λn¯
³
1− e−rδ
´i ³
1−α
α
´
ωx/r
r + λn¯
(8)
and hence:
eλn¯δerδ
λγn¯
=
Ã
1− e
−rδ
r
λn¯ + 1
!µ
1− α
α
¶µ
L
n¯
− 1
¶
/r
from which we get:
ϑ (L/n¯)
ϑL
> 0
Hence an increase in L raises the ratio L/n¯. Not too surprisingly any increase
in the labor force, that is in the population size, does not raise proportionally the
research labor. This is due to that the R&D sector is supposed to be subject to a
kind of congestion. The term e−λn¯δ refers precisely to this congestion: the higher the
amount of labor devoted to research the lower from an individual firm’s perspective
the chance of winning the R&D race and the less profitable to invest in R&D activities.
As far as the balanced growth is concerned the final output good during the time
interval t can be written as
yt = At(L − n¯)α
hence it follows
yt+1 = γyt
As in Aghion and Howitt (1992 and 1998) we can write
ln y (τ + 1) = ln y (τ ) + ε (τ )
where τ refers to real time and ε the number of innovations between τ and τ +1.
The crucial point is represented by ε: in this framework the number of innovations
is bounded above.
This is due to the timing of the model according to which on one hand research-
firms need to see the previous innovation before anyone can think of the new one, on
the other hand an innovation becomes known just after both the first phase and the
second one are closed.
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During the second phase in spite of the discovery made in the first one no new
innovation can be introduced in the system -regardless of the R&D eﬀort- due to that
no firm knows what has already happened. Hence the average growth rate of the
economy is
g =
κX
j=0
(λnτ)j e−λnτδ
j!
j ln γ = λm (n) ln γ (9)
where λm (n) =
Pκ
j=0
(λnτ )je−λnτδ
j!
j which is bounded above by κ ≡ 1δ . Hence
regardless of the amount of skilled labor the information/dissemination lag puts an
upper bound to percapita growth rate, thereby eliminating the well known scale eﬀect
property of Aghion and Howitt (1992) proved by Jones (1995) to be inconsistent with
existing data.
4. Concentration and Cooperation in the R&D Sector
The main feature of the decentralized setting is the congestion phenomenon due to
the information-gap aﬀecting negatively research-eﬀort. This is rather realistic in
an economy in which a large number of small firms undertake independent R&D
projects. In the model of the previous section this was stylized by the assumption of
zero-measure firms. Though in the real industrial world it is frequent for small firms
to exchange some relevant information with each other, the character of a firm as an
information barrier (Jovanovic and Rob 1989, Jovanovic and MacDonald 1994, Jo-
vanovic and Rousseau 2001) provides strong incentives for firms to merge their R&D
units or to let them cooperate (Cozzi 1999). In this model with free entry, trad-
able factors, and constant returns homogeneous R&D workers extract all producer’s
surplus generated: hence large firms can be equivalently be seen as skilled workers’
R&D associations. The aim of reducing the information dissemination lag provides a
natural motivation for R&D firms to merge and/ for R&D workers to cooperate with
each other. Of course, the antitrust authorities should worry that a cartel of R&D
producers might refrain from innovation by internalizing the business stealing exter-
nality. Hence it seems important to investigate which firm size is the more adequate
system to overcome this sort of congestion without discouraging aggressive innovative
activity. The aim of this section is precisely to define the number of research-firms
that maximizes growth.
The relationship between the number of research-firms and research-eﬀort has to
be verified. We can assume that N research-firms participate in R&D race6. Any
research-firm i devotes exactly nit to R&D sector with
nit ≡
nt
N
6In the following analysis we assume N ≥ 2.
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where nt is the total amount of labor employed in the research-sector.
In the determination of its R&D eﬀort each firm cares about the probability of
winning the R&D race. This is inversely related to R&D eﬀort of the other research-
firms.
Focusing on symmetric equilibria we can re-write the arbitrage condition for the
firm i as follows:
ωt = e−λ
(N−1)
N
ntτδe−rδλ
γ
h
r + λnt+1
³
1− e−rδ
´i
π˜t+1/r
r + λnt+1
(10)
where e−λ
(N−1)
N
ntτ δ refers to the probability of success for the firm i. It is expressed
in terms of the number of research-firms working in the market and total amount of
labor employed in R&D, and it can be seen that RHS is a decreasing function of N .
The following holds:
Proposition 1. The higher the number of non-cooperating research firms, N , the
lower the probability of a firm’s winning the R&D race, the lower the expected value
of an hour in research. The higher the number of firms in the market the stronger
the eﬀects of the information-gap, the lower the expected aggregate growth rate, and
the lower the skilled/unskilled wage gap.
Proof. Let us rewrite the arbitrage condition as
φ (nt, N) ≡ e−λ
(N−1)
N
ntδe−rδλ
γ
h
r + λnt+1
³
1− e−rδ
´i
π˜t+1/r
r + λnt+1
− ωt = 0
Then according to the implicit function theorem we know that
∂nt
∂N
= −∂φ (•) /∂N
∂φ (•) /∂nt
where
∂φ (•)
∂N
= −λntδN−2e−λ
(N−1)
N
ntδe−rδ
γ
h
r + λnt+1
³
1− e−rδ
´i
π˜t+1/r
r + λnt+1
and
∂φ (•)
∂nt
= −λ(N − 1)
N
δe−λ
(N−1)
N
ntδe−rδ
γ
h
r + λnt+1
³
1− e−rδ
´i
π˜t+1/r
r + λnt+1
Hence it follows
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∂nt
∂N
= −∂φ (•) /∂N
∂φ (•) /∂nt < 0
since ∂φ(•)∂N < 0 and
∂φ(•)
∂nt < 0 that is the lower the number of research-firms the
higher the equilibrium eﬀort in R&D and the higher the average growth rate of the
economy. The other statements follow straightforwardly. Q.E.D.
Hence due to that both the R&D eﬀort is inversely related to the number of
research-firms and the higher the research-eﬀort the higher the average growth rate
of the economy we can conclude that the best solution under laissez-faire is obtained
when a minimum number of firms operate in the market that is when N = 2. Since
skilled workers are always better oﬀ the relatively larger their R&D firm we can
conclude:
Corollary 2. An antitrust policy that seeked to maximize growth would allow the
formation of a non-collusive duopoly in the R&D sector, which would immediately
form.
It is important to remark that here the duopoly emerges endogenously as R&D
workers would tend to unify their eﬀort, but the antitrust authorities can allow or ban
it. Hence at the R&D stage every duopolist is under the constant threat of possible
free entrants (defector groups of workers). Therefore all profits are dissipated into
skilled wage.
4.1. Monopoly or Duopoly?. Should the antitrust authority allow R&D firms
to join a unique firm, that will become the unique intermediate good monopolist7?
We just need to compare (10) with N = 2 to the following arbitrage condition of the
monopolist:
ωt = λ
(γ − 1) π˜t+1
r
(11)
and conclude that the larger the information lag, the higher the quality jump, and
the more populated the economy the more innovative the monopoly compared to the
duopoly. Reminding the reader that in this representative sector model the monopoly
should be correctly interpreted as belonging to an infimum sub-sector of the whole
economy, it may be interesting to note that our analysis implies that - ceteris paribus
- when a large area integrates economically it is more likely that antitrust authorities
7Taken literally in Aghion and Howitt’s (1992) economy the monoopolist would also have monop-
sonist power. However their macroeconomic focus - which is also ours - clarifies that it should be
interpreted as a representative industry in a large set of industries.
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concerned with innovation would decide to allow more concentration than smaller
areas. The reason is that with a large skilled labor mass working for the rival each
duopolist would seriously fear that its potential discovery could already be - or will
soon become - obsolete.
5. Endogenous Skills
Up to now we have being following Aghion and Howitt’s (1992) assumption of a
fixed composition of the labor supply between skilled and unskilled workers. In this
section we show that our analysis allows to relate eﬃciency enhancing mergers to the
endogenous composition of the labor force.
In fact it is straightforward to endogenize the suppy of skills in this economy,
by adapting to the closed economy framework Dinopoulos and Segerstrom’s (1999)
methodology. We will assume that individuals are finitely lived members of infinitely
lived households, being continuously born at rate β, and dying at rate d, with β−d >
0; D > 0 denotes the exogenously given duration of their life. People are altruistic in
that they care about their household’s total discounted utility according to the usual
intertemporally additive functional. They choose to train and become skilled at the
beginning of their lives, and the (positive) duration of their training period - in which
the individual cannot work - is exogenously fixed as T < D.
Hence an individual with ability θ ∈ [0, 1] uniformely distributed decides to train
if and only if the following is satisfied:
Eτ
"Z τ+D
τ
e−r(s−τ )wu(s)ds
#
< Eτ
"Z τ+D
τ+T
e−r(s−τ )max (θ − γ, 0)w(s)ds
#
with 0 < γ < 1/2, and with Eτ denoting expectations as of time τ . Notice that an
individual of ability θ > γ is postulated able to accumulate skill (human capital) θ−γ
after training, while individuals with too low ability (θ < γ) never get any skill from
schooling.
As Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) we focus on the steady state (balanced
growth) analysis, in which all variables - and real wages in particular - are expected
to grow at the same constant expected growth rate as At. Hence any individual will
decide to get an education if and only if her ability level is no less than
θ0 = σ
ωu
ω
+ γ,
with σ > 0 being a parameter dependent constant. Therefore the aggregate supply
of unskilled labor at time t is
M(τ) ≡ θ0L(τ) =
µ
σ
ωu
ω
+ γ
¶
L(τ ) (12)
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and the aggregate supply of skilled labor at time τ is
Ls(τ) = (θ0 + 1− 2γ) (1− θ0)φL(τ )/2 (13)
with 0 < φ < 1.
Since the fraction of the population that decides to get skilled is only dependent on
the productivity adjusted skilled/unskilled wage ratio and on parameters the results
of the previous sections continue to hold and we can state:
Proposition 3. The lower the number of non-cooperating R&D firms, N , the higher
expected aggregate growth rate, the higher the skilled/unskilled wage gap, and the
larger the fraction of population that decides to get skilled.
Proof. Just repeat the proof of Proposition 1 using (12) and (13) instead of
M = 1 and L.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that due to the information gap between research firms
a kind of congestion appears in the R&D sector. This phenomenon, reducing the
research eﬀort, aﬀects negatively growth. Moreover being R&D eﬀort inversely related
to the number of non-cooperating research firms, we conclude that the most growth
enhancing policy under laissez-faire is to allow at least a contestable duopoly for
each innovative industry. It seems interesting that the information dissemination
lag allows us to capture in a unified framework phenomena – such as the wage
inequality, mergers and their interplay – analysed in often unrelated investigation,
although with similar time pattern.
It seems interesting to re-interpret some recent trends in the US and EU in light
of our simple model’s results. Since the mid 70’s - also due to weaker international
barriers and fierce competition by newly industrialized countries - US and EU au-
thorities have relaxed their antitrust policy against mergers and R&D cooperation in
order to improve their competitiveness. This has stimulated R&D eﬀorts, reduced
innovation delay (see Agarwal and Gort, 2000), improved product qualities at a faster
rate, and at the same time it has increased wage inequality and the fraction of the
highly educated population.
Although our results, being presented in a new analysis perspective, seem consis-
tent with the real world empirical evidence on intefirm barriers, the related incentives
for firms to cooperate, and the plausibile link between market structure, wage inequal-
ity, and growth, yet they have been obtained within the extremely stylized Aghion
and Howitt’s (1992) framework. It would be interesting to extend our logic to an
explicitly more complex frameworks, such as for example Aghion et al. (2001).
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